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Market processes suggest legal figures that are applied effectively and efficiently. In the 
Ecuadorian case, it is essential for legal institutions to be strong, which implies formality and 
stability. However, for this to happen, it is necessary to implement legal reforms to improve 
market regulation. For this reason, this article aims to examine, utilizing the analytical-
conceptual, economic, and normative method, certain legal structures with their rules of the 
game, highlighting those barriers in the rules of entry, permanence and exit from the market. 
Keywords: financial market, business, economic system, legal reform, law enforcement. 
 
Resumen 
Los procesos de mercado sugieren figuras legales que se apliquen de forma efectiva y eficaz. 
En el caso ecuatoriano, es imprescindible que las instituciones jurídicas tengan fortaleza que 
implica formalidad y estabilidad. Sin embargo, para esto es necesario implementar reformas 
legales que permitan mejorar normativamente la regulación del mercado. Por esto, este artículo 
pretende examinar, mediante el método analítico-conceptual, económico y normativo, ciertas 
estructuras jurídicas con sus las reglas de juego, destacando aquellas barreras en las reglas de 
entrada, permanencia y salida del mercado. 
Palabras clave: mercado financiero, empresa, sistema económico, reforma jurídica, aplicación 
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In Ecuador, countless administrative regulations and legal norms have been introduced, which 
have varied according to how they were enacted, the customs, the political orientation of the 
government in power, and the social conceptions that society was living and experiencing at 
that time.  
 
Therefore, this article roughly alludes to the policies that have remained in force until the 
present date, which, from the legal analysis, reveal and reflect the guidelines and orientations 
that previous governments had, given that, throughout this contribution, the normative reality 
that governs, directs, and establishes the rules of the game of the Ecuadorian market is reflected. 
For Giler and Méndez (2018): 
It is essential to revive developing countries’ economies by taking advantage of existing 
advantages and overcoming fears of commercial dynamics. It is necessary to 
intelligently identify and take advantage of the potential of internal resources: for 
example, natural resources and geographical location. (p. 70) 
 
Moreover, it is first necessary to determine what is understood by the market; the market is the 
ideal framework in which the interaction between supply and demand of a product or product 
line takes place, in which suppliers and demanders are related, regardless of the legal 
framework governing a specific market (Méndez, 2017; 2019).  
 
Thus, the development of this article begins with the study of the "merger control regime in 
Ecuador" and involves revising the "right to freedom of association and competition" as a right 
recognized by the Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador. Later, the question of whether 
concentrations effectively violate the right of competition and the different types of 
concentrations established in the Organic Law of Regulation and Control of Market Power is 
based. Also, it is analyzed from the normative point of view regarding the efficiency of 
applying the norm, the competence of the Superintendence of Control of Market Power to know 
and resolve issues of control of concentrations. 
 
Like this, after the analysis of the existing regulations, as well as the competencies of the 
Superintendence for the Control of Market Power, it is concluded that economic concentrations 
are a danger when the economic agent restricts the competition of others in the market so that 
other economic agents are harmed; however, concentrations can be defined as positive, because 
they contribute to the growth of the country's economy (Botello y Guerrero, 2019).  
 
However, due to the inevitable business crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, it is 
necessary to analyze those legal tools of business rescue that allow a company to remain in the 
market or exit it in an orderly manner through an agreement with its stakeholders. Therefore, 
the second section highlights those general aspects of the Ecuadorian reorganization 
proceeding and the potential obligation to strengthen the procedure through the Economic 
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The third section developed in this article has been called "The shareholders' agreement as a 
mechanism to position family businesses in Ecuador." This section reviews the shareholders' 
agreement and good corporate governance as efficient tools/instruments to improve the organic 
structure of the company and its positioning in the market. The study focused explicitly on 
family-owned corporations, defining share ownership as a problem because it restricts access 
to secondary markets.  
 
Accordingly, we focus on the last section of this paper called "Challenges for a strategic plan 
for Regulatory Improvement in Ecuador" since we believe in regulatory reform as the 
generation of clear rules, simplified procedures and services, and effective institutions for 
creating and applying all the above-mentioned aspects (rules, laws, policies, entities in charge, 
among others). In this sense, Glass and Newig (2019) pointed that: 
Such adaptive governance arrangements can be decisive when dealing with highly 
dynamic and long-term sustainability problems. This in turn requires reflexivity of 
institutions and procedures, a governance characteristic that often seems to contradict 
traditional rationalist problem-solving approaches. (p. 100) 
 
As mentioned in the previous sections, regulatory reform is considered necessary due to the 
constant institutional problems in Ecuador derived from the erroneous manifestation to provide 
solutions to issues, the drafting of extensive regulations in force, but little application (Olivares 
and Medina, 2020).  
 
Methodology: qualitative, normative, and doctrinal analysis 
 
First, based on a qualitative methodological approach, it can be argued that the legal and 
administrative standards that regulate the market have undergone the most significant number 
of changes and transformations. It is explained because legal and administrative measures have 
generally been adapted to the political ideology of the government in power; a possible 
example is an ideological and political change that Ecuador will surely experience with the 
positioning in the "executive power" of a character who claims to break with the ideology that 
has remained in power for more than ten years (Méndez, 2019). 
 
Second, the article proposes the conceptual and theoretical ius-economic analysis following 
previous contributions of authors such as the Argentinian professor Juan Carlos Cassagne 
(2001) to strengthen future studies of the contemporary processes of market reform and 
regulatory improvement for Ecuador. 
However, as has been pointed out, both motivations (ideological and practical) are often 
intertwined. On the other hand, there is a legal significance that lies in the technique of 
transferring large parts of the public sector of the economy to the private sector. 
(Cassagne, 2001, p. 443) 
 
Third, due to the objective of this contribution, the qualitative and theoretical approaches 
present the ideal framework that allows, on the one hand, to investigate deeper into the existing 
theory concerning the topic in question and, on the other hand, to review the Ecuadorian 
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framework concerning legal-economic regulation, since, as Korstjens and Moser (2017, p. 275) 
state, qualitative research studies reality from its natural context. Furthermore, the use of 
qualitative research through the proposed techniques responds to the need to investigate social 
and organizational behaviours that explain the effects of the interaction of the different 
economic, legal, and political agents involved in the regulatory procedures, hence the 
importance of using tools that allow greater freedom during the information gathering process. 
In Carrigan and Coglianese (2011) words: 
Although the existence of industry pressure on regulatory policy is undeniable, such 
pressure may well explain only a limited set of decisions by regulatory agencies. Likely, 
industry influence fluctuates over time, especially across different administrations. (p. 
110) 
 
Therefore, the methodology proposed for this article has been applied and replicated for legal 
research to determine a) relevance and b) importance and c) ensure its originality. The 
qualitative (theoretical and conceptual) research proposed in this article focus on defining the 
discussion topics is the legal analysis of market reform and regulatory improvement for 
Ecuador and searching for legal information that can be classified as “recognized,” “current," 
and "pertinent," mainly for Latin America and Ecuador. We have rejected proposals focused 
mainly on advocacy (dissemination of ideas) and without scientific significance (low impact 
on academia), primarily showing an ideological bias or a partisan approach. 
 
The right to associate and business concentration regime 
 
In the Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, freedom is attributed as one of the personal 
rights. Article 66, paragraph 13 states, "The right to associate, assemble and demonstrate freely 
and voluntarily" (CRE, 2008). Its main objective is to guarantee the freedom of association and 
competition of natural and legal persons. 
 
As an example of this principle, business concentrations arise as operations carried out by 
economic agents within the market, intending to unify their assets or absorb the support of 
another economic agent and operating under the figure of a single legal entity (Lara and 
Méndez, 2020). These control operations can occur in two ways: vertically and horizontally. 
As "Acts of economic concentration" in Ecuador, they are regulated by the Superintendence of 
Control of Market Power.  
 
Some authors state that the concentration of companies arises when an economic agent loses 
its independence by concentrating through the structural modification of its assets (Cevallos, 
2005). Thus, the practice of engagements in the economic system may violate the rules 
established through competition law. That is the institutional framework that governs the free 
competition of suppliers or consumers themselves. In this sense, Jenny (2016): 
The scope of what one should consider being the institutional design of a competition 
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of its internal organization and its relationship with the outside (be it the government, 
parliament, the business community). (p. 2) 
 
There are different types of concentration, such as total or partial; temporary or irreversible; 
horizontal (at the same level of activity) or vertical (within the same sector of economic 
activity), at different levels: production, distribution, marketing, and other subsectors. (Lizana 
and Pávic, 2002, pp. 509-510; Cevallos, 2005, pp. 18-20). 
 
Competition law in recent years has had a significant impact on society, and one of its 
objectives has been to encourage economic agents to carry out concentration operations to 
obtain greater participation in the market (Galvez and Galvéz, 2020). These concentration 
operations have been established in the Organic Law of Regulation and Control of Market 
Power and are regulated by the Superintendence of Control of Market Power.  
 
Regulation of economic concentrations in Ecuador - Superintendence for 
the Control of Market Power (SCPM) 
 
The Organic Law on Regulation and Control of Market Power, enacted in 2011, is the first 
competition regime in Ecuador. It has application in five areas: 1) conducts considered abuse 
of dominant position; 2) restrictive agreements and practices; 3) unfair competition; 4) control 
of economic concentrations; 5) public aid. (Pérez, Marín and Navarrete, 2018, p. 72). 
  
The regulatory body for controlling concentrations in Ecuador is the Superintendence of 
Control of Market Power. This institution is the Intendancy of Investigation and Control of 
Economic Concentrations (ICC), which will resolve the notifications of economic 
concentration submitted by economic operators.  
 
Then, the merger control model will involve an analysis from the regulatory point of view 
regarding the efficiency of applying the regulation and the competence of the Superintendency 
for the Control of Market Power to know and resolve merger control issues. In this sense, 
OECD (2020) says that: 
Market performance refers to how well a market achieves a certain public policy 
objective, such as an efficient and equitable outcome. Within competition policy, 
market performance is usually understood in a consumer welfare sense, that is, a market 
performs well if it provides good outcomes for consumers. In jurisdictions with a total 
welfare standard, performance refers instead to how well a market promotes efficiency 
in terms of resource allocation, production scale and cost technology. (p. 12) 
 
Economic concentrations mainly contribute to the growth of the country's economy so that they 
are beneficial to the market. “Competition is necessary and healthy in any market and sector in 
the world, as it generates several advantages, among which we can mention, that it allows self-
regulation of prices in the market and encourages the productivity of the sector” (Trujillo et al., 
2017, p. 70) However, these concentrations represent a danger when the activities being carried 
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out by the economic agent restrict competition through the entry and exit barriers, collusive 
agreements in such a way that they generate damage to other economic agents.  
 
Insolvency proceedings: An ius-economic approach 
 
The consequences of the global health crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic have been 
incalculable. In Ecuador, economic agents have been severely affected, particularly companies 
that had to adapt their business model to the use of platforms and logistic channels based on 
new technological developments that, in some cases, gave results but, in others, did not allow 
them to overcome the decrease in production and the provision of services. Across the OECD 
(2021): 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) account for 99% of all businesses and 
between 50% and 60% of value-added. SMEs are particularly vulnerable during the 
crisis. In addition to SMEs, the self-employed represent a considerable share of total 
employment in a few OECD countries. Amounting to slightly less than 15% on average, 
self-employment is particularly prevalent in Greece, Italy, and Turkey where it exceeds 
20%. The self-employed are often less protected by unemployment benefits compared 
with standard workers. (p. 49) 
 
It is due to the number of contractual, legal, and economic obligations pending with 
stakeholders or other agents with a direct or indirect legal-economic relationship with the 
company, among other impediments that only aggravate a business economic crisis into a 
systemic and structural one.  
 
Based on these considerations and in the face of a significant economic crisis, companies must 
have a range of options to adequately determine the probability of exiting or remaining in the 
market in an orderly manner. In any of these cases, it is essential that there is an effective 
procedure for restructuring and reconversion of assets, for which we must consider a proactive 
state intervention to establish an efficient specialized agency that allows the enforcement 
(compliance) of the rules of the game (North, 1990) necessary to generate a cordial 
environment between the debtor company and its creditors. This institutional solution is known 
in the legal field as reorganization proceedings, which an economic point of view allows 
facing—high transaction costs and agency costs Typical of the ups and downs of the market 
process.  
 
A Preventive Bankruptcy Law (2006) aimed explicitly at Ecuador's commercial companies 
with certain regulatory limitations. However, this has been scarcely applied so that 
subsequently, the Organic Law of Entrepreneurship and Innovation (2020) was issued. This 
law provides for a restructuring procedure for enterprises open to the microenterprise sector. 
Finally, due to the pandemic, the Organic Law of Humanitarian Support (2020) was published 
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exceptional preventive concordat with two legal sub-institutions that provide for speed and 
efficiency, with comprehensive coverage of subjects who may avail themselves of such 
concordat. 
 
Considering that only some companies could keep operating during the confinement and that 
others did not find a way to continue their commercial activities, the latter generated obligations 
that are not faced with resources due to "ordinary" management. Moreover, considering that 
creditors may have incurred debts. They had planned to pay to fulfil the company's obligations, 
which leads to a more significant conflict (Fushimi, 2020).  
 
Furthermore, due to the current business crisis, it is necessary to consider a legal alternative for 
business rescue, such as the reorganization proceeding, which is a mechanism that "proposes a 
legal solution for those companies that are going through economic difficulties and need to pay 
off and respond to their creditors" (Mendoza and Méndez, 2020, p. 371), this tool also has the 
purpose that the creditor waives the right to demand the company's bankruptcy, and the latter 
can overcome its debts (Mendoza and Méndez, 2020). 
 
The Ecuadorian Concurso Preventivo Law does not meet the objective of allowing the 
companies that request it to remain and exit the market in an orderly and efficient manner. 
Therefore, the reformulation of this legal mechanism must entail establishing a solid and 
institutionally competitive regulatory framework.  
 
In addition, the new Organic Law on Entrepreneurship and Innovation and the Organic Law 
on Humanitarian Support to Combat, the Health Crisis, Derived from Covid-19 should unify 
the bankruptcy procedure. An alternative would be their legal integration to implement a 
consolidated and easily discernible framework so that companies organized through 
"conventional schemes" and entrepreneurs and SMEs can access their trusteeship, facing lower 
transaction costs. It also implies the introduction of a package of regulatory improvements to 
eliminate bureaucratic and legal barriers. This is because: 
The challenge for governments is, on one hand, to balance their need to use 
administrative procedures as a source of information and as a tool for implementing 
public policies, and on the other, to minimize the interferences implied by these 
requirements in terms of the resources demanded to comply with them. (OECD, 2009, 
p. 6) 
 
There is a unique need for facilitators to handle negotiations between the debtor company and 
the stakeholders not to overburden the Judiciary. For this, it is necessary to create alternative 
administrative or private channels, for example, avoiding the meaningless recognition of 
credits that is merely a formality, a step that can be simplified if this body hires qualified 
companies to evaluate this situation quickly and at lower costs, so that the specialized body 
would have more time to supervise. For this it’s necessary to explain that: 
Negotiation systems create a structure to encourage and facilitate direct negotiation 
between parties to a dispute, without the intervention of a third party. Mediation and 
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conciliation systems are very similar in that they interject a third party between the 
disputants, either to mediate a specific dispute or to reconcile their relationship. 
Mediators and conciliators may simply facilitate communication or may help direct and 
structure a settlement, but they do not have the authority to decide or rule on a 
settlement. Arbitration systems authorize a third party to decide how a dispute should 
be resolved. (Center for Democracy and Governance, 1998, p. 4) 
 
The regulatory unification and the implementation of high-status organizations will be able to 
configure a legal figure with strength, carrying out an economic analysis of costs and benefits. 
It is relevant since the comprehensive services obtained for the debtor company and its 
creditors have been demonstrated that, with adequate parameters, can fit the national reality 
and, even more, the financial consequences caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
Shareholders' agreements and family-owned companies 
 
In Ecuador, commercial legal entities are traditionally managed by family structures that link 
their existence to descendants' participation in their administration. However, Ecuadorian 
corporate legislation provides for five types of commercial legal entities, among which is the 
corporation, which according to the Companies Law, is characterized as a type of company 
whose capital is divided into negotiable shares made up of the contributions of the shareholders 
(LC, 1999, Art. 143).  
 
In this country, family structures also manage corporations, which also concentrate the 
ownership of their shares. The prevalence of the family character in Ecuadorian closely held 
corporations limits their possibilities of diversifying funds, and this scenario restricts their 
growth and access to national and international secondary markets. As an alternative source of 
financing, corporate law makes available to commercial companies the establishment of 
shareholder agreements called shareholders agreements for addressing these restrictions.  
Shareholder agreements are contracts that govern the relationships among multiple 
shareholders in privately held and publicly traded companies, specifying details such 
as the circumstances under which each shareholder may sell, buy, transfer, pledge or 
encumber shares. As a contract, they create an obligation to action (or inaction) in the 
future and are based on mutual acceptance of the contract parties. (Binz et al., 2021,    
p. 395) 
 
These are contractual instruments that seek to regulate relations between shareholders or 
between shareholders and the management body of the companies, and good corporate 
governance, which are rules and principles whose purpose is to control the economic activity 
of companies through the transparent publication of financial non-financial information. 
The family structure present in closed stock companies seeking financing limits their 
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exchanges, and this scenario restricts their growth. Furthermore, it occurs to the extent that to 
list their securities on the stock exchange, they must offer them to a market that will be new 
company shareholders after acquiring the shares circulating on the stock exchange. This 
scenario implies that the family structure will divest itself of all the company's shares, 
discouraging them from making this decision. 
 
As mentioned above, for family-owned corporations to face these financing restrictions, 
international and Ecuadorian corporate law propose the establishment of contracts between 
shareholders called "parasocial pacts" prescribed at the national level in the Companies Law; 
and norms and principles of regulation of the economic activity of companies, known as good 
corporate governance, contemplated in the Ecuadorian Norms for Good Corporate 
Governance, issued in Resolution SCVS-INC-DNCDN-2020-0013 of the Superintendence of 
Companies, Securities and Insurance, published on September 1, 2020. 
In terms of legislative policy, a trend towards recognition of the validity of this type of 
agreement could be expected when it comes to agreements that are part of the social 
contract. On the other hand, since it was not, the logical thing would be to hope that the 
appropriation of some shareholders of the role of administrators would be outlawed. 
This is what is observed in the regulation of two foreign legal systems with different 
legal traditions, as explained below. (Lagos, 2019, pp. 10-11) 
 
Although Ecuadorian law has developed a first legal framework for shareholders' agreements, 
it does not contemplate aspects such as their constitutive elements and the effects of their 
enforceability. 
 
The entry of new shareholders into family-owned companies is a direct consequence of shares 
on the stock exchanges. This scenario causes the companies' difficulty of decision-making 
within the companies since more shareholders must agree, which implies that their interests 
must converge. However, applying a contractual model in which shareholders delegate 
company control to a manager or administrator (agency model) to simplify the decision-making 
process will allow them to manage effectively. Moreover:  
The incremental approach to strategic decision making is characterized by the 
instinctive process of choosing alternatives, built based on learning and 
experimentation; by the problem analyzed not being fully clear; by the generation of 
alternatives as the objectives are clarified for all; by the search for the creation of a 
stable environment aiming at the exchange of knowledge; by the decisions to be made 
inside the organizational subsystems. (Lamb, Vieira, and Pereira, 2017, p. 80) 
 
Even in a successful application of the agency model, problems arise due to information 
asymmetries and conflicts of interest between the companies' management (management) and 
ownership (shareholders). Shareholders' agreements regulating relations between shareholders 
and between shareholders and management can be used to deal with these problems. 
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Besides, essential reflections can be highlighted, such as the opinion of Bonmatí (2011), who 
-in summary- argues that shareholder agreements, being part of an extra-statutory -or 
parasocial- contract, allow optimizing the regulation of relations between partners since 
through this instrument it is possible to establish commercial legal guidelines that the 
subscribing parties must obligatorily comply and fulfil. 
The above conceptualizations of the shareholders' agreement allow us to identify - in general 
terms - functional regulatory realities for the establishment of future complementation of the 
national corporate regulations in which the shareholders' agreements establish efficient rules 
for access to the stock market within family-owned corporations and these companies achieve 
financing with lower agency and capital costs. 
 
For shareholders' agreements for facilitating the entry of companies into the stock market and 
for paving the way for the complementation of the existing regulations on shareholders' 
agreements, it is necessary to include elements to improve them as an instrument to help family-
owned companies diversify their financing possibilities and consequently enhance their 
competitiveness in the market. 
 
Based on the revision of the Argentine, Colombian and Spanish doctrine on shareholders' 
agreements, we propose integrating three elements in the Ecuadorian regulation: the objective 
coincidence, the subscription of the arrangement using a public instrument, and the corporate 
interest.  
 
The objective coincidence, an element extracted from the Argentine jurisdiction, according to 
Adad (2012), states that the obligations of the shareholders' agreement cannot contravene those 
that the shareholders have previously subscribed with the company. Therefore, including this 
element in the Ecuadorian legislation will make it possible to control those shareholders who 
do not subscribe through shareholders' agreements obligations contrary to those they have with 
the corporation. Therefore, compliance with this instrument is practical and not detrimental to 
closed family corporations. 
 
The element extracted from the Colombian jurisdiction is the social interest. According to 
Córdoba (2014), this element should be understood as the convergence of the interests of the 
shareholders, those of the company represented by the management body and those of 
interested third parties, which may be: a) the State, through control entities or, b) investors, in 
the stock market. Therefore, implementing the social interest as a constitutive element of the 
shareholders' agreements in the Ecuadorian regulations will make it possible to integrate the 
interests of family corporations' control and management bodies and ensure correct decision-
making to enter the stock market. 
 
Finally, from the review of the Spanish jurisdiction and as mentioned by Maldonado (2017), 
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annexation to the deeds of the company (bylaws or articles of incorporation), and it is needed 
because it enables the exercise of control over its content. Thus, in the Ecuadorian case, both 
the Superintendence of Companies, Securities and Insurance and investors (interested third 
parties) may exercise control over the agreement's content. The latter will especially know its 
content and formulate an offer based on that information. 
Good corporate governance is a corporate instrument that originated in companies listed on 
stock exchanges, whose mismanagement has caused their bankruptcy and has harmed their 
shareholders and investors. The default of listed companies such as Enron, Worldcom in the 
United States, and Polly Peck in England led to the creation of rules and principles for 
controlling the economic activity of companies and providing financial and non-financial 
information relevant to the stock market.  
Also, good corporate governance has become an essential element when attracting investors 
and maximizing the economic value of listed companies. Its objective is to increase 
transparency in the information related to their economic activity, which serves as a decisive 
element when carrying out a stock exchange operation. (Vásquez-Palma and Vidal-Olivares, 
2016, pp. 391-392). 
 
The Cadbury Code, one of the first codes of good corporate governance globally, implemented 
a rule that enacted optional compliance with its laws and principles and the obligation to 
explain the cases in which compliance was partial or null. This rule allowed a flexible 
application of good corporate governance, and it could be adapted to the circumstances of each 
of the public limited companies that listed their securities.  
The main contributions of agency theory to thinking about and reforming corporate 
governance are the ideas of risk, the uncertainty of results, incentives, and information 
systems. The study of conjectures that applies agency theory to corporate governance 
issues continues to grow because it frequently tries to explain real events that occur in 
the world. (Garzón, 2021, p. 183) 
 
It also supports the stock market's control of compliance with suitable corporate governance 
measures since, according to the level of compliance, i.e., the amount of information available 
on the issuing company, the stock market would invest in one or other companies. This rule 
would later be known as the "comply or explain rule". Duh (2017) says: 
Several formal regulations and informal guidelines, recommendations, codes, and 
standards of corporate governance have been established or improved to determine 
good corporate governance. These efforts to improve corporate governance practices 
have raised an important dilemma within the corporate governance field, whether to 
develop hard law (i.e., mandatory requirements, hard regulations, and regulatory 
approach) or soft law (i.e., voluntary recommendations, soft regulations, and market-
based approach) to improve corporate governance across countries. (n. d.) 
 
At the national level, good corporate governance has been included in Resolution No. SCVS-
INC-DNCDN-2020-0013 of September 1, 2020, contains the Ecuadorian Standards for Good 
Corporate Governance, issued by the Superintendency of Companies, Securities and Insurance, 
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the regulatory body for companies in Ecuador. This instrument compiles the rules and 
principles of good governance applied by closed family-owned corporations whose objective 
is to open to the stock market as an alternative financing mechanism to improve their position 
in the market. 
 
Like the Cadbury Code, this instrument recognizes volunteer application as one of its 
principles, aims to regulate relations within the controlling body (shareholders) and between 
the latter and the management body of the companies. Hence, it allows the formulation of 
measures aimed at solving agency problems within its structure to guarantee the efficient 
investor management of its line of business.  
The Cadbury Code and Report was the starting point for this new direction. It combined 
a set of principles of good governance that served as a how-to guide for listed 
companies. It established a regulatory framework that guided equity capital markets 
and proposed ways that shareholders – principally institutional investors – should relate 
to the companies in which they invest. (Nordberg, 2020, p. 1) 
 
Afterwards, those family-owned closed stock companies that adopt the Ecuadorian Standards 
for Good Corporate Governance will be able to access the stock market with a mechanism that 
allows them to face future agency problems. These companies will also enter the market with 
an incentive to receive investment since compliance with the rules, structures, and procedures 
established by this instrument ensure that investors obtain a profit and that managers do not 
misuse the funds that investors receive in return from investors (Kaen, n.d., cited by Tsagas, 
2020, p.14).  
 
The suitable corporate governance measures they adopt should enable them to position 
themselves in the market by making it easier for them to face greater competition and 
strengthen their competitiveness strategies by improving their institutional framework. And 
that’s because “institutional investors search for companies with good governance practice 
since they need assurance for their investment to be protected” (Duh, 2017, p. 75). Therefore, 
companies should be encouraged to adopt the good corporate governance standards issued by 
the Superintendency of Companies, Securities, and Insurance.  
Likewise, the complementation of the regulations ruling shareholders' agreements is necessary 
for this instrument to make it easier for the partners of a company to enter private contracts to 
agree on the management and control of the company and thus reduce the problems (costs) of 
agency within a family corporation and ensure that the family structure remains in the 
controlling body of the company.  
Instead of traditional principal-agent conflicts espoused in most research dealing with 
developed economies, principal–principal conflicts have been identified as a major 
concern of corporate governance in emerging economies. Principal–principal conflicts 
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ownership, extensive family ownership and control, business group structures, and 
weak legal protection of minority shareholders. (Young et al., 2008, p. 39) 
 
Therefore, the harmonization of the two corporate instruments in the Ecuadorian corporate 
regulations and the management practice of the companies will allow them to strengthen their 
internal structure and the relations between their management and control bodies. Furthermore, 
this will enable them to have alternative access to the stock market as a financing mechanism 
to enhance their competitiveness in the market. 
 
Thoughts about regulatory improvement 
 
In Latin America and Ecuador, state or bureaucratic bodies have constantly been subjected to 
the service of private interests. Because of this issue, the governments of the time have not 
been able to give a clear and effective response to the malfunctioning of these bodies and the 
service they provide (Lepage, 1980) since it is intended to solve these problems by drafting 
new regulations, which can be found in force, but not in compliance. (Polga-Hecimovich, and 
Trelles, 2016). 
 
This "normative nature" problem has generated an overproduction of norms within Ecuador; 
therefore, it also generates antinomies, anomalies, and other types of normative conflicts. These 
norms are formulated without the proper legislative technique (for example, the legal 
"amalgam" is not considered, so antinomies arise). In addition, this problem affects the 
population at all levels of government in the country since there is no proper guarantee of legal 
security due to the high probability of change in the legal framework, especially in economic 
matters (Ghersi, 1991). 
 
Consequently, regulatory improvement is a tool for regulatory review of an economic nature 
that promotes market development. Accordingly, the OECD strongly encouraged this public 
policy to help emerging countries in various aspects of development. In addition, the OECD 
continually generates new tools for member and non-member countries wishing to adopt such 
public policies that improve both the economic and social scenario. 
It was not until 2013 that the "Plan Nacional del Buen Vivir del año 2013-2017" (National Plan 
for Good Living 2013-2017), which includes to some extent regulatory reform, was established 
within Objective 1.4, which revolves around improving the regulatory and control power of 
the state, where several steps are determined to achieve the effective fulfilment of this objective 
(SENPLADES, 2013).  
 
Within Axis 2 and 3, it is indicated that regulation should be improved at the level of all 
governments to attract Foreign Direct Investment to grant better conditions, as well as 
facilitating access to the state market while reducing red tape such as administrative costs and 
encouraging the population for the development of economic activities. (SENPLADES, 2017).  
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Following the National Plan, revised in 2018, the "Law for the Optimization and Efficiency of 
Administrative Procedures" was issued. This law seeks to eliminate and reduce the paperwork 
system of state agencies to promote administrative simplification, which is understood as a 
public policy that aims to reduce bureaucracy in state institutions by reducing the burdens 
placed on them in the exercise of their functions (López and Ariño, 2003). However, there are 
no clear procedures or mechanisms to be followed for effectively enforcing the law in all public 
organizations at all levels of government. Furthermore: 
The problem in Ecuador concerning this principle is the excessive regulation that limits 
freedoms and, on the other hand, the lack of efficient regulation when there are 
situations that warrant it. Moreover, an example will be presented that demonstrates 
how, in certain situations, state intervention is not necessary since, if excessive 
regulation were started, the free and correct functioning of the market would be 
restricted, as the same as if the deregulation was implemented, it would cause a chain 
of negative impacts. (Heredia et al., 2020, p. 125) 
 
Instead, regulatory improvement also aims to identify and eliminate bureaucratic barriers, 
defined as the set of demands, requirements, limitations, or prohibitions established by public 
administration entities materialized in regulations or ordinances (Pacharres, 2014). In addition, 
it can be understood as the result of rigid or unrealistic rules by state administrations. These 
barriers hinder and restrict market access within an economic scenario by directly affecting 
economic agents, divided into three groups: families, companies, and governments. 
The Ecuadorian State must establish a more solvent regulatory policy that allows monitoring 
the regulatory improvement of its regulated entities to eliminate contradictory norms that slow 
down the access or performance of activities by economic agents. Without the need to generate 
excessive public expenditure within this policy, since, as has been demonstrated in other 
legislations, such as the Mexican one, it is not necessary to have many state agents in charge 
of overseeing regulatory policies—only a small group in charge of coordinating specific 




Ecuador has gone through a highly controversial political history, which has impacted the 
economic models adopted, then it is challenging to keep up with the changing trends that 
emerge.  
From a review of this, it is possible to conclude that, upon analyzing Ecuadorian regulations 
regarding competition law and its conceptual and operational determination, it is necessary to 
adopt policies that contribute to economic growth in the State. Regarding economic 
concentrations, it is required to ensure that competition is not restricted by specific economic 
agents, as seen in the analysis carried out, which specifies the terms of reference to achieve the 
desired goal.  
Subsequently, reorganization proceedings require a new regulation, which should seek to 
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exit the market should be facilitated. It should also focus on advertising a reliable and 
transparent mechanism to promote the dynamism characteristic of the market. Then, for 
properly implementing these mechanisms, a comparative study of legislation containing 
insolvency structures with positive results and, in other cases, certain shortcomings that can be 
considered for a correct Economic Analysis of the Preventive Insolvency Law in Ecuador 
should be carried out.  
The government and private actors have identified the need to identify mechanisms that allow 
positioning family businesses in Ecuador, and this support could be provided through the 
agreements between shareholders. It is possible to consolidate the organic structure of a 
company from its doctrinal verification, as well as making visible a tool for this type of 
associations, which constitute a large part of the Ecuadorian market, to emerge in their 
positioning in the market and have the possibility of entering secondary markets through 
improvements in the implementation of good corporate governance standards.  
Finally, based on the points discussed throughout this study, it is evident that the Ecuadorian 
legal scenario requires an adequate approximation of institutions that, although they have been 
briefly incorporated into the legal system, have not been developed in such a way that the 
normative configuration and the spirit of the law applicable to the matter are tools for those 
who venture into the market. 
 
References 
Adad, C. (2012). El Protocolo Familiar como Acuerdo Parasocial. Su trascendencia en las 
empresas familiares. [Tesis de Maestría, Universidad Austral, Buenos Aires Argentina] 
https://n9.cl/nweqv  
Asamblea Constituyente del Ecuador. (2008). Constitución de la República del Ecuador. 
Registro Oficial 449. https://n9.cl/hd0q  
Binz, C., Astrachan, J., Kotlar, J. and Michiels, A. (2021). Addressing the theory-practice 
divide in family business research: The case of shareholder agreements. Journal of 
Family Business Strategy, 12(1), 1-11. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2020.100395  
Bonmatí, J. (2011). Acuerdos entre accionistas.  Revista CONT4LBL3, (40), 16-21. 
https://n9.cl/vcjcd  
Botello, H. and Guerrero, I. (2019). Competencia, concentración de mercado e innovación en 
Ecuador. Ecos de Economía, 23 (48), 16-33. https://doi.org/10.17230/ecos.2019.48.2  
Cabrillo, F. (2017). Las decisiones judiciales de la administración de justicia: intereses y 
preferencias. En R. Méndez Reátegui, (ed.), Reflexiones Jurídicas Vol II, (pp. 23-63). 
Quito, Ecuador: Centro de Publicaciones PUCE. https://n9.cl/gqhi1  
Cachanosky, J. (2007). La economía, el derecho y el "Análisis Económico del Derecho". 
https://n9.cl/mqzof  
Carrigan, C. and Coglianese, C. (2011). The Politics of Regulation: From New Institutionalism 
to New Governance. Annual Review of Political Science, 14, 107-129. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.032408.171344   
Cassagne, J. C. (2001). Evolución de los principios aplicables a los servicios públicos y 
problemas actuales tras los procesos de privatización en Argentina. Revista de 
Administración Pública, (157), 467-494. https://n9.cl/xgto1  
Center for Democracy and Governance. (1998). Alternative dispute resolution practitioners' 
guide. Washington: Technical Publication Series. https://n9.cl/acnlj  
Cevallos, V. (2005). Analizando el impacto de la regulación: Hacia una visión pragmática. 
Lima, Perú: Regulación Racional. 
Lissangee Mendoza, Rubén Méndez, Jennifer Lara, José Portilla, Jostin Suárez. Regulatory reform policies for 




Córdoba, P. (2014). Derecho de sociedades y gobierno corporativo: Interés social, órganos, 
accionistas y administradores. Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad Externado de 
Colombia. 
Duh, M. (2017). Los códigos de gobierno corporativo y su papel en la mejora de las prácticas 
de gobierno corporativo. In O. L. Emeagwali (Ed.). In book: Corporate Governance 
and Strategic Decision Making. DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.69707  
Fushimi, J. F. (8 de mayo de 2020). Posibles salidas de la crisis económica post-Covid-19. 
Comercio y Justicia. https://n9.cl/oc953f 
Galvéz, I. and Galvéz, R. (2020). Nuevos retos del Derecho de la Competencia ante el auge del 
Comercio Electrónico. Revista de la Facultad de Jurisprudencia, 2 (8), 73-94. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.26807/rfj.v2i8.283  
Garzón, M. (2021). El concepto de gobierno corporativo. Revista Científica "Visión de Futuro", 
25 (2), 178-194. DOI: 10.36995/j.visiondefuturo.2021.25.02R.005.en  
Ghersi, E. (1991). El coste de la legalidad: Una aproximación a la falta de legitimidad del 
Derecho. THĒMIS-Revista de Derecho, (19), 5-14. DOI: 
10.36995/j.visiondefuturo.2021.25.02R.005.es  
Giler, M. and Méndez, R. (2018). Ecuador: Fortalecimiento Institucional y Negociaciones 
Efectivas en el Escenario Internacional. Revista de la Facultad de Jurisprudencia, (4), 
1-72. DOI: https://doi.org/10.26807/rfj.v0i4.98  
Glass, L. and Newig, J. (2019). Governance for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals: 
How important are participation, policy coherence, reflexivity, ¿adaptation and 
democratic institutions? Earth System Governance, 2. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esg.2019.100031  
Heredia, A., Santacruz, A. y Zaldumbide, V. (2020). Smart Regulation in times of COVID 19: 
An introspective preliminary analysis for its application in Ecuador. Revista de la 
Facultad de Jurisprudencia, 1 (8), 120-164. DOI: 10.26807/rfj.vi8.305  
Jenny, F. (2016). The institutional design of Competition Authorities: Debates and Trends. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2894893  
Korstjens, I. and Moser, A. (2017). Serie: Guía práctica para la investigación cualitativa. Parte 
2: Contexto, preguntas de investigación y diseños, European Journal of General 
Practice, 23 (1), 274-279. https://n9.cl/i6fut 
Lagos Villarreal, O. (2019). La cuestión de la licitud o ilicitud de los pactos de accionistas 
relativos al voto de directores de sociedades anónimas. Revista Chilena De Derecho, 
46 (1), 7-28. https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-34372019000100007  
Lamb, L., Vieira, G. and Pereira, M. (2017). The strategic decision-making process in mergers 
and acquisitions: the perspective of acquired companies from the south of brazil. 
Revista Base (Administração e Contabilidade) da UNISINOS, 14 (2), 75-91. 
https://n9.cl/9bdny  
Lara Alvear, J., and Méndez, Reátegui, R. (2020). Derecho y Economía: Régimen jurídico del 
control de las fusiones empresariales en el Ecuador. Quito, Ecuador: Corporación de 
Estudios y Publicaciones - CEP. https://n9.cl/x5fy7  
Lepage, H. (1980), Cómo encauzar el crecimiento del Estado. Conferencia Española Francesa 
sobre la Nueva Economía. 
Ley 50 de Modernización del Estado. (1993, 31 de diciembre). Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador 




ReHuSo: Revista de Ciencias Humanísticas y Sociales 
e-ISSN 2550-6587 
https://revistas.utm.edu.ec/index.php/Rehuso/index 
Vol. 7 Núm. 1 (66-84): Enero - Abril 2022  
rehuso@utm.edu.ec 
Universidad Técnica de Manabí 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5823396 
 
Ley de Compañías. (1999, 5 de noviembre). Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador. Registro Oficial 
No. 312. https://n9.cl/s8x5x  
Ley de Concursos Preventivos. (2006, 21 de diciembre).  Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador 
Registro Oficial No. 422.  https://n9.cl/7j0dm  
Ley Orgánica de Apoyo Humanitario para combatir la crisis sanitaria derivada del Covid-19. 
(2020, 16 de junio).  Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador.  Registro Oficial No. 225. 
https://n9.cl/ydje1  
Ley Orgánica de Emprendimiento e Innovación. (2020, 28 de febrero). Asamblea Nacional del 
Ecuador. Registro Oficial No. 151. https://n9.cl/rgkrw  
Ley Orgánica de Regulación y Control del Poder de Mercado. (2011, 13 de octubre). Asamblea 
Nacional del Ecuador. Registro Oficial No. 555. https://n9.cl/s2cfr  
Ley para la Optimización y Eficiencia de los Procedimientos Administrativos. (2018, 23 de 
octubre).  Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador. Registro Oficial No. 353. https://n9.cl/1r48v  
Lizana, C. and Pavic, L. (2002). El control preventivo de las fusiones y adquisiciones frente a 
la legislación antimonopolio. Revista Chilena de Derecho, 29 (3), 507-555. 
https://n9.cl/61egg  
López, C. G. and Ariño, O. G. (2003). La competencia en sectores regulados: Regulación 
empresarial y mercados de empresas. Granada, España: Comares Editores. 
Maldonado, P. (2017). Los acuerdos parasociales: Naturaleza y eficacia jurídica. En Consejo 
General de los Colegios Oficiales de Corredores de Comercio (eds.), Cuadernos de 
Derecho y Comercio. Extraordinario, 257-295. 
Méndez Reátegui, R. (2017). Ensayos sobre instituciones, coordinación y teoría jurídica. 
Quito, Ecuador: Centro de Publicaciones de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del 
Ecuador. https://n9.cl/avy0e  
Méndez Reátegui, R. (2019). Ensayos sobre instituciones, coordinación y teoría jurídica, 2da 
edición. Quito, Ecuador: Centro de Publicaciones de la Pontificia Universidad Católica 
del Ecuador. 
Mendoza García, L. S. y Méndez Reátegui, R. (2020). Algunos aspectos teórico-conceptuales 
de la regulación del procedimiento concursal preventivo de las sociedades mercantiles 
en el Ecuador. En R. Barcia, M. Safar, G. Lascano y R. Méndez, Reflexiones jurídicas 
VI (segunda parte), (pp.357-399). Quito, Ecuador: Centro de Publicaciones de la 
Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador. https://n9.cl/n7szh  
Nordberg, D. (2020). The Cadbury Code and Recurrent Crisis A Model for Corporate 
Governance? Macmillan: Palgrave. 
North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
OECD. (2009). Overcoming barriers to administrative simplification strategies. 
https://n9.cl/arzf  
OECD. (2020). Merger Control in Dynamic Markets. https://n9.cl/9smhe 
OECD. (2021). The Territorial Impact of COVID-19: Managing the Crisis and Recovery across 
Levels of Government. https://n9.cl/e1yin 
Olivares, A. y Medina, P. (2020). La persistente debilidad institucional de Ecuador: protestas, 
elecciones y divisiones políticas durante el 2019. Revista de Ciencia Política, 40 (2). 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-090X2020005000110  
Pérez, D., Marín L. and Navarrete, M. (2018) El régimen de fusiones en Ecuador. En A. Brown, 
D. Robalino y O. Santos (eds.), Estudios de Derecho de Competencia Ecuatoriano, 
(pp.71 - 85). Quito: FRediciones. 
Lissangee Mendoza, Rubén Méndez, Jennifer Lara, José Portilla, Jostin Suárez. Regulatory reform policies for 




Polga-Hecimovich, J. and Trelles, A. (2016). Las consecuencias organizativas de la política: 
Una agenda de investigación para el estudio de la política burocrática en América 
Latina. Latin American Politics and Society, 58 (4), 56-79. doi:10.1111/laps.12002  
Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo. (SENPLADES) (2013). Buen vivir: Plan 
nacional 2013-2017: todo el mundo mejor. SENPLADES. https://n9.cl/niolv 
Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo. (SENPLADES) (2017). Buen vivir: Plan 
nacional 2017-2021: toda una vida. SENPLADES. https://n9.cl/vj24g 
Sumar- Albujar, O. (2018). Más allá del análisis económico de la regulación. Mejora 
regulatoria y enfoques multidisciplinarios. Quito, Ecuador: Centro de Publicaciones de 
la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador. 
Superintendencia de Compañías, Valores y Seguros. (01 de septiembre de 2020). Normas 
Ecuatorianas de Buen Gobierno Corporativo. Resolución No. SCVS-INC-DNCDN-
2020-0013. R. O. 1076 de 25 de septiembre de 2020. 
Trujillo, D., Puente, C. and Andrade, K. (2017). Concentración Económica en el Mercado 
Cervecero Ecuatoriano. Revista Ciencia Unemi, 10 (25), 67-78. https://n9.cl/vt45g  
Tsagas, G. (2020). A Proposal for Reform of EU Member States' Corporate Governance Codes 
in Support of Sustainability. Sustainability, 12 (10), 1-25. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12104328  
Vásquez-Palma, M. and Vidal-Olivares, A. (2016). Aplicación de los principios de gobierno 
corporativo a las empresas no cotizadas en Chile. Una aproximación desde el derecho 
corporativo europeo y comparado. Vniversitas, 65 (133), 383-444. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.vj133.apgc  
Young, M., Peng, M., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. and Jiang, Y. (2008). Corporate Governance 
in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal–Principal Perspective. Journal of 
Management Studies, 45 (1), 196-220. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00752.x   
 




Lissangee Mendoza García 
 
Concepción y diseño, investigación; metodología, 
redacción y revisión del artículo 
 
Rubén Méndez Reátegui 
 
Jennifer Lara Alvear 
 
José Portilla Ruiz 
 
Jostin Suárez Jacome 
 
Investigación; análisis e interpretación 
Adquisición de datos, análisis e interpretación 
 
Investigación; análisis e interpretación 
 
 




Investigación; análisis e interpretación 
 
  
 
